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Abstract
The United States Supreme Court effectively dismantled the pre-clearance provision of the
Voting Rights Act in Shelby County, AL v. Holder (2013). The majority asserts that “times have
changed” and the relevant provisions of the VRA are now obsolete. This paper examines
whether dismantling preclearance adversely affects how long racial and ethnic voters must wait
to vote. The results show that the VRA reduces the time minority voters waited in line by onehalf in the covered jurisdictions. After preclearance is dismantled, however, that benefit
vanishes. Further, minority voters in covered jurisdictions continue to wait longer to vote
compared to white voters and that increment reduces their turnout in small but potentially
consequential amounts. We argue that dismantling Section 5 creates an environment where
inconvenient voting requirements are now acceptable. Fundamentally, when citizens are not
treated similarly with regard to democratic practices such as voting then the country’s
democratic culture is threatened.

Keywords: voting rights, voting behavior, race and politics, election administration
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. . ., things have changed dramatically. Shelby County contends that the preclearance requirement, even without regard to its disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments
have a good deal of force. In the covered jurisdictions, “[v]oter turnout and registration rates
now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels. . . .”
At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. The question is
whether the Act’s extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States,
continue to satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short time ago, “the Act imposes
current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”
Chief Justice John Roberts, Shelby County, AL v. Holder (2013)

“Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not
getting wet.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Shelby County, AL v. Holder (2013)

Introduction
James Madison reassures the public that democracy is protected through the exchanges
emerging naturally from a broad republic because it enlarges the number of policy concerns
demanded by the public thereby forcing elites to compromise these diverse interests rather than
succumb to the passions of factions. (Federalist 10). Guaranteeing broadly inclusive political
participation then seems essential to protect the character of democratic government. Political
institutions alone though do not necessarily ensure democracy. A commitment to democratic
values, ideals, and practices by citizens and officials contribute to stable democratic government
(Dahl 1998). A democratic political culture must recognize that all citizens should be treated
similarly when exercising their democratic rights such as voting. This paper argues that the
election environment following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, AL v. Holder
(2013) reduces the opportunities for Madison’s call for diverse participation that leads to an
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enlarged public view. More importantly, the Shelby decision creates an environment in certain
jurisdictions that tolerates election day obstacles thereby threatening democratic culture.
Underlying the logic of the majority opinion in Shelby County is that the intrusive tools
used in the Voting Rights Act (also VRA) to root out discriminatory voting practices are no
longer needed. In fact, it is due to the Voting Rights Act’s success that its coverage formula in
Section 4(b) is unnecessary. Registration rates for African Americans are virtually equal to those
of the white population and minority elected officials are in assemblies at all levels of
government. The problem is that this very success leads to the majority decision that the
expansive reach of the VRA no longer is justified.
Indeed, Justice Ginsberg in dissent argues that the advances of minority voters and
representatives would be threatened by the elimination of Section 4(b). The deterrent effect and
oversight are still needed because some jurisdictions continue to attempt to dilute minority voter
strength (Kousser 2015; Lopez 2014; Greenbaum, et. al. 2015). Between January 1995 and June
2014, more than 300 lawsuits or Department of Justice administrative determinations led to the
rejection, abandonment, or modification of proposed changes to voting practices. Of those 300
plus actions, there were 113 denials of proposed voting changes in 15 states using preclearance
(National Commission on Voting Rights 2014).
The benefits of the VRA also extend to the type of representation provided by members
of Congress. Congresspersons from covered jurisdictions are more supportive of civil rights
legislation compared to legislators representing non-covered districts (Schuit and Rogowski
2017). Further, there is evidence that racial polarization has increased in the covered jurisdictions
over the past decade thereby calling for the continuance of the VRA (Ansolabehere 2009;
Ansolabhere, Persily, and Stewart 2010).
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We apply what we know about the determinants of participation from voting theory with
whether election-day obstacles continue to exist in VRA covered jurisdictions. Present-day
discrimination is frequently subtle and nuanced. It can take the form of seemingly neutral
policies yet they can exert a consequential negative impact. Further, relatively minimal
inconveniences to voting can reduce the likelihood to participate—particularly among lowpropensity voters (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, Nie 1993; Leighly and Nagler 2014). Has the
Shelby decision changed the participatory environment in measurable ways? One possible metric
that can be used to assess irregularities is the length of time citizens must wait to vote. We find
that the pre-clearance provisions reduced the length of time minority citizens waited to vote in
covered jurisdictions, but in the post-Shelby era those benefits disappear.

The Significance of Shelby County v. Holder
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is one of the most momentous and far-reaching civil
rights policies of the last century. By prohibiting massive discrimination in voting by states and
local jurisdictions with a history of voter exclusion it transformed the political landscape in the
South, and then later in other parts of the United States through its extension to include language
minorities. For example, between 1965 and 1985 the disparity between white and black
registration rates in covered jurisdictions declined from 30% to 8% (Brennan Center for Justice
2018), and the number of African American elected officials serving in public office in the
original six states covered by the Voting Rights Act increased from 345 in 1965 to more than
3,700 in 2006—a 1000% increase (H. R. Report 2006, 18; Grofman and Handley 1991). The
VRA is seen as contributing to the partisan realignment of the South where race-sensitive white
voters move to the Republican Party as newly enfranchised African Americans identify with the
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Democratic Party (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Black and Black 2003). It is beyond question
that the Voting Rights Act changed the electoral environment and substantially shaped politics
for the last fifty years.
Why is the decision in Shelby County v. Holder consequential? In order to understand
the significance of the Court’s decision it is necessary to understand how Sections 4 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act operated. The Congressional authors of the VRA designed a flexible and
powerful policy that can adapt to different circumstances in its effort to fight vote discrimination.
Section 2 affirms the Fifteenth Amendment by providing a litigative avenue for citizens to sue in
a federal district court who believe they are wrongly denied their right to vote (VRA 1965 Public
Law No. 89-110). Litigative strategies though are time consuming and expensive, and therefore
an inadequate remedy for large-scale voter discrimination.
Sections 4(b) and 5 (Preclearance) should be understood as operating in tandem to
counter the problems of broad vote denial (VRA 1965 Public Law No. 89-110). Section 4(b)
specifies a formula designed to thwart widespread vote denial that is resistant to the litigative
remedy available in Section 2. If less than 50% of the eligible population either voted in the
1964 presidential election or were registered in 1964 and that jurisdiction maintained a voter
qualification device such as a literacy test then the mechanism is triggered. The coverage
formula though has not been updated since the 1975 Amendment to the VRA when Congress
added language minorities as a protected class which increased the number of covered
jurisdictions subject to preclearance. Since 1975, the coverage formula relies on data from the
1968 and 1972 presidential elections (VRA 1965 as amended in 1975, Sec. 202 and Sec. 203).
Once the Section 4(b) formula is triggered then that jurisdiction is now automatically covered
and its voting arrangements are suspended. Section 5 requires that any covered jurisdiction must
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submit proposed changes to their voting rules or structures to either the Department of Justice or
the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia for approval (U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division). Section 5—known as ‘preclearance’—is a uniquely effective provision
that prevented attempts at vote dilution by covered jurisdictions. Jurisdictions, knowing that
proposed changes to their voting rules must gain approval, are reluctant to suggest any alteration
that would have a negative impact on minority voting. Importantly, Section 5 is meaningless
without the coverage formula of Section 4(b); if a jurisdiction is not covered by the formula then
changes to its election arrangements do not require prior approval.
The reach of the VRA is beyond question. After adoption in 1965 the entire states of
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, 40 counties in North
Carolina, and 5 counties in Florida violated the automatic trigger (U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division 2015). Subsequent amendments to the VRA designed to protect language
minorities added Arizona, Texas, Alaska, and selected counties across the United States (United
States Department of Justice 2016).
The Supreme Court decided in Shelby County that the Section 4(b) coverage formula is
unconstitutional because it relies on data that is 40 years old. The Court only needed to strike
down Section 4(b) in order to render Section 5 empty. The majority reasoned that the United
States made dramatic progress removing racial barriers to voting since 1965. Further, Justice
Roberts acknowledges in the majority opinion that discrimination still exists. If Congress
believes that the intrusive federal remedy of preclearance is necessary then the coverage formula
must be modernized to reflect contemporary conditions. Consequently, challenges to new voting
rules or political structures such as adopting stricter voter identification requirements or moving
from a single-member district system to at-large representation can now be challenged only
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through Section 2. But litigative remedies are difficult, slow, expensive, and limited in their
reach. Further, the high burden of proving discriminatory intent is placed on the plaintiff and not
the state when using Section 2. A degree of transparency is lost, too. Under Section 4(b),
jurisdictions’ proposed changes to voting procedures must be announced and reviewed by a third
party.
After Shelby, formerly covered jurisdictions no longer need to report their voting changes
to the Department of Justice or the District Court. Almost immediately after the Court announced
its decision several previously covered states including Texas, Alabama, and North Carolina
declared plans to adopt new stricter voter identification laws (Brennan Center for Justice 2014).
In North Carolina, for example, the legislature enacted an election reform package which
required changes to the state’s voting procedures. The Fourth Circuit enjoined the proposed
election law modifications finding that they targeted African American voters (Harvard Law
Review 2017). Nor is there clear evidence that the elections of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012
demonstrated that the United States is now a ‘post-racial’ society across all states—there is
persistent evidence of racially polarized voting, especially in the covered jurisdictions. “There
can be no question that the gap in vote preferences between white and minority voters is larger in
the covered than the noncovered states” (Ansolabehere, Persily, and Stewart 2010, 6; see also
Kimball 2013, 8). In short, the decision in Shelby County fundamentally changes the
environment for voting procedures in states.
Voter Participation and Election Administration
Rational theories of political participation are often seen as inadequately explaining why
citizens vote (Achen and Bartels 2016; Blais and Young 1999). However, they do offer a useful
insight into evaluating the effects of obstacles experienced by voters on election day. Rational
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models rest on the basic assumption that citizens vote when they recognize their perceived net
benefits from participating exceed the net costs they incur from abstaining (Downs 1957;
Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Citizens can calculate their expected utility in numerous ways.
They can estimate their perceived material benefit by comparing the policies of parties and
candidates. More likely voters are motivated by a diverse set of psychological factors such as
fulfilling their civic duty through voting, heeding the encouragement of family, friends, and coworkers, or responding to pleas by party contacts. The ‘costs’ associated with participating are
numerous and diverse, too. These can range from the difficulty connected to registration,
monetary loss due to missing hours at one’s job, or the bother of waiting in line on election day
are real costs incurred by citizens.
A cost associated with voting does not need to be high in order to deter someone from
participating. This can be understood from the paradox of voting (Blais and Young 1999). In
large mass democracies it is natural that any individual will understand their single vote
infinitesimally determines the outcome of an election. An individual may conclude s/he benefits
from a particular party’s candidate but believing their single vote will decide the election is
another matter. This outlook leads many citizens to conclude that because their vote does not
matter or have much impact—or at least, does not matter very much—they abstain so as to avoid
incurring the direct costs of participating while still collecting any collective policy benefit. In
other words, they ‘free ride.’ The paradox is given the trifling weight of anyone’s single ballot it
is remarkable that a citizen votes at all.
Nor does the participation price fall uniformly on all citizens. For some citizens a very
small cost connected to voting can decrease their likelihood to participate. Generally, individuals
who are poor, possess low levels of education and political efficacy, and not embedded in social
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networks experience the expenses connected to participating more heavily than other citizens.
Racial and ethnic minorities, persons for whom English is not their first language, and the elderly
are vulnerable to hurdles to voting. Hence, activists and scholars assert that lowering the
inconveniences linked with voting will improve turnout because it increases the net benefit
citizens receive from participating (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen
2003; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, Nie 1993; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).
Election administration can be another source of participation expense. These costs are
commonly incurred through registration practices, convenience voting, and variations in resource
allocations across precincts. The general conclusion is that strict registration identification
requirements reduces minority and Democratic turnout while increasing the gap between white
and minority voter participation (Hajnal, Lajevardi, Nielson 2017; GAO 2014), although
Ansolobehere (2009) finds a different outcome. Early voting and mail-in ballot opportunities
increase participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003),
especially among Democratic partisans and the elderly (Ashoke, et. al. 2016). Reducing the early
voting window is projected to depress minority turnout (Herron and Smith 2012), however, other
research finds that early voting depresses turnout because it reduces the excitement of election
day (Burden, et. al. 2014). In 2011 the Florida legislature reduced early voting from 14 to 8
days. Importantly, the Sunday prior to the election—a day used heavily by racial and ethnic
minorities who go to the polls following church services—was removed by the new early voting
schedule. The expectation is that minority turnout in Florida will decline (Herron and Smith
2012).
Finally, the allocation of election-day implementation resources also is important.
Turnout rises when the density of early voting sites and other precinct-level resources available
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to citizens increases (Fullmer 2015, Herron and Smith 2016). The implication is that making
more early voting sites available to citizens reduces their cost of participating which in turn
marginally improves turnout. The importance of resource allocation decisions can be seen when
examining precinct congestion data from Florida (Herron and Smith 2015). Precinct closing
times indicate how efficiently citizens are processed at polling stations. Less efficient precincts
likely will have later closing times thereby indirectly measuring the inconvenience of voting.
Herron and Smith find in their extensive sample of Florida precincts that (1) there is considerable
variation in closing times across precincts, and (2) Hispanic precincts closed unusually later than
other locations.
Less is known about the effects of how long voters wait in line at their polling stations.
Elora Mukherjee (2009) classifies waiting in line as a “time tax” that discourages many from
voting across the United States. Mukherjee finds that the time tax disproportionately affects
minority voters and voters in the South or those voters most at risk from participation costs. Of
course, multiple factors likely influence the length of voting queues on election day. The
closeness of the election, voters’ interest in the outcome, and the demographics of each precinct
are related to the level of participation in communities. It is possible that notoriously long
waiting lines might dissuade some voters from even trying to participate. Commonly known long
queues combined with the new election environment created by the removal of the most effective
voting protection in the VRA can discourage participation in the covered jurisdictions.
Considerable variation exists in the length of time voters experience across states,
regions, and demographic groups (Stewart 2013). For example, voters had shorter wait times in
less populous states compared to large population centers. Voters in the South waited longer than
those in northern states, and nationally African American and Hispanic voters waited nearly
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twice as long as white voters. There is also evidence that the length of time minority voters must
wait in line increases as the racial or ethnic population concentration increases in precincts.
Voters in largely minority precincts wait considerably longer in line to vote—sometimes three
times as long—as white voters (Pettigrew 2017). How long citizens must wait to vote offers a
glimpse into the consequences of invalidating Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act and offers
insight into the consequences of the post-Shelby voting rights environment in covered
jurisdictions.
Data and Method
This analysis uses data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys for 2008,
2012, 2014, and 2016. The CCES2 is a 50,000 plus national stratified sample survey that permits
analysis of demographic subgroups within each state or groups of states. The research procedure
is straightforward. The years selected create a pre-Shelby (2008 and 2012) and post-Shelby (2014
and 2016) quasi-experimental design. One might worry that the strategy includes one off-year
election among presidential elections. Ideally, the design would compare 2010 to 2014, however,
the question regarding length of time citizens wait to vote is not included in the earlier survey.
Moreover, 2014 and 2016 are the only elections after the Court dismantled the coverage formula.
We explore whether there is a change in the racial patterns of voter inconvenience before and
after the Shelby decision. The first election following the Shelby decision is the 2014 off-year
Congressional election. Typically, off-year elections have lower turnout and voters are strong
partisans. While the point estimates for specific variables might be less precise in 2014, the tests
for statistical significance for variables of interest should continue to hold. The dependent
variable is question CC404, “approximately, how long did you have to wait in line to vote.” The
possible responses for wait time range from (1) no wait at all, (2) less than 10 minutes, (3) 10 –
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30 minutes, (4) 30 minutes to one hour, and (5) more than one hour. In order to make wait time
more intuitively meaningful we convert each category to its mid-point in minutes, or (1) no wait
= 0, (2) less than 10 minutes = 5, (3) 10-30 minutes =20, (4) 30-60 minutes=45, and (5) more
than one hour=75.3
The length of time required to vote is an inconvenience that theoretically exerts a small,
disparate impact on certain types of voters. Two critical issues emerge. First, is there evidence of
a disparity between the waiting times for minority voters and white voters? If “things have
changed dramatically” as asserted in the majority opinion, then only minor and random
differences in wait times should exist between white and minority voters. Second, is there
evidence that pre-clearance mitigated any racially-patterned effects? And the corollary is
whether the benefits of preclearance—if any—disappear beginning in 2014. Hence, we are
keenly interested in what happens to the interactions between racial and ethnic groups and the
covered jurisdictions, before and after the Shelby decision. A related issue is whether increased
wait time decreases the likelihood that some voters ultimately participate. Presumably, as the
time required to vote increases then a small number of eligible citizens will be deterred from
voting; minimally, they must accommodate the inconvenience compared to advantaged voters.
The length of time is predicted by typical demographic factors we know explain civic
participation such as age, education, marital status, household income, and home ownership.
Additionally, controls for factors related to citizens’ engagement in politics such as attention to
the news and a constructed index variable measuring involvement and interest in campaigns and
politics are included in the model. Also included in the model is a scaled variable that measures
racial resentment. This allows us to test whether jurisdictions that exhibit increased levels of
racial umbrage also have unusually high wait times. Finally, a series of dummy variables are
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created to measure the impact of race and ethnicity as well as whether a jurisdiction was
originally covered by the VRA.
Primary interest is in the sign and statistical significance of the dummy variables and
interactions. A positive coefficient for the covered jurisdictions indicates that waiting to vote
lengthens in counties covered by the VRA. Similarly, positive coefficients for each racial or
ethnic group indicates that they must wait in line longer compared to white voters. Next is a test
for whether pre-clearance protected minorities in covered jurisdictions from the inconvenience of
lengthy voting time, and what happens—if anything—following the Shelby decision.
Accordingly, we construct interaction terms for each racial or ethnic group and whether the
county is covered by the VRA. The expectation is if preclearance protected minority groups’
voting rights in covered jurisdictions then those coefficients will be negative and statistically
significant indicating a reduction in the time required to participate. And if Shelby effectively
removed those safeguards then the interaction terms will no longer be significant in the 2014 and
2016 elections.
Two equations are estimated for each election preceding and following the Shelby
decision. The first equation establishes a baseline comparison by estimating the impact of factors
on length of time required to vote for the United States. The second model re-estimates the
original equation with a dichotomous variable for the jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights
Act,4 thereby demonstrating whether there is a difference in vote time between covered and noncovered jurisdictions.
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Waiting to Vote Before and After Shelby
Generally, African American and Latino voters wait longer to vote than white citizens.
Further, voters in the non-covered jurisdictions spend less time in line than citizens in the
covered jurisdictions. This is the pattern before and after the Shelby County decision. Overall
wait times decline in 2014 and 2016, however, whites still spend the least amount of time
waiting to vote compared to minority citizens.
Both models for the two elections preceding Shelby demonstrate the consequence of
minority status in the United States for the length of time required to vote. The baseline
(constant) value for whites controlling for demographic and mobilization factors ranges from
about 9 – 12 minutes—or the average white voter in the United States waits about 10 minutes to
vote. Being black nearly doubles wait time. On average, African Americans report waiting an
additional 8-12 minutes to vote or a total of 20 minutes. Latino wait times increase an average of
4 minutes. Nationally, race is clearly an important predictor of election day experience—
members of minority groups pay a higher ‘time tax’ compared to white voters. Further, race is
the single most powerful predictor of how long someone waits to vote after controlling for other
factors such as demographic characteristics and level of political engagement. Educational level
and owning your home marginally increase wait time as well as campaign interest and racial
resentment—but only by small amounts. There is no other variable that approaches the
dominance of race and ethnicity. Voters’ election day experience measured by the length of time
waiting to vote reflects the continuing significance of race in American politics. See Figure 2.
Model 2 illustrates the effect of the Voting Rights Act on wait times in the covered
jurisdictions. On average, living in one of the original covered states increases the length of time
required to vote from 8-12 minutes. Separately, the impact of race and ethnicity continue to
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increase wait times in the covered jurisdictions. What is the effect of pre-clearance on wait
times? As hypothesized, the interaction terms for African Americans and Latinos are negative
and highly significant in the pre-Shelby era. In fact, the point estimates for the interaction term
for African Americans reduces wait time by 4 minutes in 2008 and 8 minutes in 2012. In other
words, the effect of preclearance in 2012 counters nearly 80% of the effect of being black in a
covered jurisdiction. Similarly, the interaction term for Latinos is properly (negatively) signed
and statistically significant; the effect of preclearance reduces wait times by about 7 minutes for
Latino voters. In the pre-Shelby era the pre-clearance provision appears to largely mitigate the
effect of race and ethnicity on the length of time required to vote in the original covered areas.
Figure 3 re-estimates the above models for the post-Shelby elections. Similar to the
results in Figure 2, average wait time increases for members of racial and ethnic groups both
models. In contrast, white voters maintain their shorter wait times on election day. However, the
results for Model 2 indicate the loss of pre-clearance. There is no longer a moderating impact on
wait time in the covered and expanded-coverage states. The coefficients for the interaction terms
in 2014 and 2016 are now statistically insignificant; there is no diminishing effect from the
combination of being a member of a racial or ethnic minority and living in a covered jurisdiction
after pre-clearance is dismantled. One of the goals of the VRA is covered jurisdictions must
avoid sliding backward after making progress in ensuring voting rights. Yet the covered states
now appear to lose ground by continuing to exhibit a racial and ethnic effect.
Figure 4 summarizes the results by comparing wait times in 2012 and 2016 for white,
African American, and Hispanic voters. Notice that in 2012—prior to the Shelby County
decision—preclearance decreases wait times for African American and Latino voters. However,
in 2016 the reduction in wait time disappears. However, it is also important to note that overall
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wait times declined in 2014 and 2016 for white and African American voters; the pattern is
mixed for Latino voters. At the same time, while the overall pattern is declining wait time across
jurisdictions in the United States minority voters still spend longer in voting queues compared to
white citizens. A systematic racial pattern continues to prevail in the post-Shelby voting rights
environment where voters are not treated similarly.
The Indirect Benefits of the Voting Rights Act
The results indicate that Section 5 preclearance reduced the length of time black and
Hispanic voters waited to vote but that benefit vanishes following the Shelby decision. An
important question is whether increased waiting times actually matters for citizens’ likelihood to
vote. Remember that the calculus of voting implies that small costs [inconveniences] associated
with participating might be large enough to discourage some citizens from voting on election
day. Relatively small reductions in participation can be consequential given winner-take-all
electoral rules in the United States. Further, the effect of wait times cannot be evaluated in
isolation from other inconveniences of voting. Restrictive identification requirements, purges of
voters with irregular voting histories, errors on registration lists, and other costs in combination
with wait time can exert small but real depressing effects on citizens’ likelihood to vote. In order
to gauge the effect (if any) of waiting in line we estimate a logistic function for the likelihood of
either abstaining or voting (0/1) predicted by the demographic and political engagement
variables used in the models. The length of time required to vote is now included as an
independent variable and estimates the impact of each increasing time increment extending the
wait to vote on the likelihood of voting.
Figure 5 reports the probability of voting for an average citizen who has no wait to those
who waited in line for one hour in 2012 and 2016. Predictably, the relative contribution of
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waiting in line is quite small—once voters are waiting in line, the likelihood is that they will
complete their vote despite their election day experience. However, there is a small number of
individuals who apparently depart out of frustration as their wait lengthens. In fact, there is
virtually no difference across white, African American, or Hispanic voters; the inconvenience of
moving from no wait to standing in line for one hour reduces the likelihood to vote by about onethird of one percent prior to the Shelby decision. What is striking, however, is the fact that there
are increases in 2016 for all groups. Clearly, these are small increments—the largest increase is
for African Americans whose probability of not voting increases by 0.9% and Latino voters
whose likelihood of not voting increases by 0.4%. Further, these marginal increases suggest
there are broader effects in the post-Shelby voting environment that are not simply associated
with how long one must wait in line to cast their ballot. Also while these appear as small changes
they are sufficiently large to influence the outcome of competitive races. Furthermore, the effects
of waiting in line should be interpreted in combination with other voting administration obstacles
which collectively exert a depressing effect on turnout. Figure 6 displays the pattern for each
group and consistent with voting theory the largest depressing effects are felt by African
American and Latino voters.
Also noteworthy is the probability that white citizens abstain from voting increases by
0.3% in the post-Shelby elections. In the years immediately following the adoption of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 there was evidence that previously disenfranchised white citizens—
especially in rural counties—benefited from the pro-active measures taken by local governments
to encourage participation. It appears that Section 4(b) might have provided an indirect benefit to
all voters by making public officials sensitive to the importance of unhindered access at the polls.
Perhaps an unintended but important outcome of the Shelby decision is it increases the
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inconvenience of voting for all voters in the U.S. Perhaps one way of viewing the Voting Rights
Act is that it created a uniform standard for election administration in the United States that
benefitted all citizens regardless of race or ethnicity. This national standard for conducting
elections appears to be lost by the Shelby decision. This in turn increases the likelihood of
substantial variation in election administration across states and counties.
An important caveat must be recognized regarding estimating the likelihood that long
wait times deters citizens from voting. The number of citizens who report waiting in line but do
not vote is small. Therefore, the results should be interpreted cautiously because the outcomes
predicted by the logistic function could be attributed to classification error by a low-frequency
group of respondents in a large-n survey (Ansolabehere, Luks, Schaffner 2015). The results
though call for the need for greater investigation of the effects of either waiting in long lines to
vote or the perception there will be a long wait to vote on participation.
Discussion
The premise of Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder is that
because aggregate-level registration and turnout rates by race approached parity then the blatant
intervention into states’ conduct of elections triggered by Section 4(b) can no longer be justified.
Yet the justices recognize that race-based discrimination in voting still occurs. One of the most
serious concerns among voting rights advocates is that by dismantling Section 4(b) then Section
5 preclearance is no longer able to block or require modification of statewide voting changes that
prior to Shelby would likely have been prohibited. Contemporary discrimination is rarely overt
and perhaps is unintended in some circumstances. Latter-generation racial discrimination often is
subtle and can assume a variety of forms. Hours after the Court announced the Shelby decision
the state of Texas announced it would adopt new voter identification requirements that had been
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previously blocked by the Department of Justice using preclearance. Similarly, North Carolina,
Mississippi, and Alabama also announced new voter identification laws (Lopez 2014).
One unanticipated result is the inconvenience of waiting in line increased for white
citizens, too. The likelihood of not participating because of the inconvenience of waiting in line
increases for everyone after the Shelby County decision. Hence, adjusting the Voting Rights Act
to “current needs” might benefit from greater standardization of election administration. The
impact of voting obstacles is small but nevertheless consequential. In 2016, waiting longer than
30 minutes reduced the likelihood that an average white citizen votes by an additional 0.3% and
an average black citizen by 0.9%. In a political system with plurality electoral laws small
reductions in the vote can determine winners and losers as evidenced by the 2016 presidential
election. The results also imply that state-level practices regarding election administration are
significant. The relative weakness of demographic and political engagement factors predicting
the length of time required to vote compared to the power of race and ethnicity indicate that the
latter continue to be powerful divisions in American society.
Minority citizens often look to the national government and the Department of Justice in
particular as a protector of their fundamental rights. Dismantling preclearance effectively
changes that relationship and reasonably increases anxiety among minority voters. A practical
consequence of the Court’s decision in Shelby County is that states are freer to create
environments that are perceived as being either facilitating or discouraging to voters. The results
above continue to show differential election day experiences largely explained by race and
ethnicity; however, there are fewer remedies available to affected citizens. Robert Dahl
observed, “The prospects for stable democracy in a country are improved if its citizens and
leaders strongly support democratic ideas, values, and practices. The most reliable support comes
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when these beliefs and predispositions are embedded in the country’s culture . . . . In other
words, the country possesses a democratic political culture (Dahl 1998, 157).”
A surprising and disconcerting result is the racial and ethnic patterns associated with long
waiting times for the entire country. This suggests that the benefits of the VRA indirectly extend
to the entire United States. In fact, in some covered and uncovered jurisdictions obstacles which
increase the inconvenience of voting are advancing. The Brennan Center for Justice (2017)
reports that since February 2017, the legislatures in 27 states introduced bills that restrict voting
access. Many of these bills are introduced in states not originally covered by the Voting Rights
Act.
An important caveat must be mentioned. The post-Shelby environment is examined using
two elections—the only elections available since the Court decision. It is not possible to
determine if a maturation process will eventually manifest itself in these communities. This calls
for the need for additional research into election day experiences following the loss of
preclearance.
It is difficult to directly connect the removal of Section 4(b) to racial and ethnic
discrimination using only the length of time required to vote. The special election of Doug Jones
to the United States Senate in Alabama is in part attributable to high African American turnout.
Thus, it is possible that under the right conditions minority voting can be mobilized to decisive
levels. Yet the results suggest something has meaningfully changed. The post-Shelby results
imply an emerging environment in some states that is tolerant of increased burdens and
inconveniences on voting for citizens in the United States. Perhaps in 1965 an unimagined
benefit of the Voting Rights Act is it established a minimal, uniform expectation regarding
voting procedures. Devolution though means that states enjoy much greater freedom to engineer
20

voting practices and these changes will be more difficult to remove using only litigative
strategies available through Section 2. The result is likely to be much greater variation in election
administration that is beyond remediation.
James Madison expounded on the benefits of an enlarged public view in Federalist 10.
He reasoned that we should rightly fear the power of faction. The barest of majorities is capable
of pursuing its self-interest in defiance of others and the collective welfare of the nation.
Prejudice and jealousy confound the dangers factions pose. As a palliative to these concerns,
Madison found some measure of safety in the breadth [geographic size] of the new republic. The
diverse interests necessarily included in political discussion and decision making might forge
compromise among the disputing factions. Democratic government needs an enlarged public
view. Providing for an enlarged public view demands that needless obstacles to voting be
removed—especially if they disadvantage marginalized groups in society.
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Figure 2
Minutes Waiting to Vote Pre-Shelby
2008
Model 1
United States

2012

Age
Education
Family income
Married
Own home

-0.053***
0.579***
0.939***
-0.722**
0.304

Model 2
Covered
Jurisdictions
-0.053***
0.566***
0.920***
-0.693**
0.408

News Interest
Party ID
(7-cat)
Campaign interest
Racial resentment

-0.562**
-0.258***

-0.577***
-0.344***

-0.399***
-0.0029

-0.350**
-0.067

0.466***
-0.461***

0.471***
-0.519***

0.294***
0.0007

0.291***
-0.027

10.52***
2.857***
1.306
0.728
2.601*
1.769

10.228***
3.625***
1.349
.116
2.055
1.474

7.735***
3.549***
3.664***
2.489*
0.872
1.588*

8.851***
5.104***
1.953
2.160
0.675
1.244

Dummy variables:
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Mixed
Other
Covered states
Interactions:
White x covered
Black x covered
Hispanic x covered
Asian x covered

Constant
13.237***
R-squared
0.033
N
18,989
White is omitted category
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Model 1
United States
-0.057***
0.434***
0.8444***
-0.954***
0.966***

Model 3
Covered
Jurisdictions
--.058***
0.401***
0.813***
-0.897***
0.978***

7.108***

4.602***

-1.354
-3.973**
-6.546***
-1.821

-0.553
-6.238***
-7.737***
8.105***

12.669***
0.045
18,989
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10.798***
0.028
25039

10.516***
0.036
25,039

Figure 3
Minutes Waiting to Vote Post-Shelby
2014
Model 1
United States

2016

Age
Education
Family income
Married
Own home

-0.099***
-0.118***
-0.204**
0.335**
-0.095

Model 2
Covered
Jurisdictions
-0.099***
0.133***
-0.211**
0.331**
-0.089

News Interest
Party ID
(7-cat)
Campaign interest
Racial resentment

0.001
-0.001

0.024
-0.021

-0.538***
-0.001

-0.495***
-0.049

0.380***
0.065**

373***
0.062**

0.436***
0.091*

0.438***
0.081

Dummy variables:
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Mixed
Other

2.783***
2.847***
3.457***
0.321
0.537
0.011

2.687***
3.286***
2.862***
0.643
0.823
0.344

3.964***
2.035***
1.415**
-0.367
1.101*
-0.387

4.061***
1.864***
1.451***
-0.099
1.178*
-0.207

Covered states
Interactions:
White x covered
Black x covered
Hispanic x covered
Asian x covered
Constant
8.967***
R-squared
0.046
N
22,545
White is omitted category
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Model 1
United States
-0.093***
0.322***
0.056
-0.274
-0.290

Model 2
Covered
Jurisdictions
-0.092***
0.298***
0.049
0.262
0.357*

-0.347

2.557***

1.566*
1.180
-0.523
5.193***

1.147
-1.18
0.483
1.245

8.881***
0.049
22,545
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11.707***
0.019
29,868

11.227***
0.027
29,868

Figure 4
Minutes to Vote
(Covered Jurisdictions)
Separate Effects in Minutes
Panel A
Year
White

2008
2012
2014
2016

12.6
10.5
8.8
11.2

Black

Latino

Covered

Total
White

Total
Black

Total
Latino

10.2
8.8
2.7
4.1

3.6
5.1
3.3
1.9

7.1
4.6
0
2.5

19.7
15.1
8.8
13.7

29.9
23.9
11.5
17.8

23.3
20.2
12.1
15.6

Separate Effects in Minutes with Pre-Clearance
Panel B

2008
2012
2014
2016

PrePreClearance Clearance
(black)
(Latino)
-4
-6.5
-6.2
-7.7
0
0
0
0
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Total
White

Total
Black

Total
Latino

19.7
15.1
8.8
13.7

25.9
17.7
11.5
17.8

16.8
12.5
12.1
15.6

Figure 5
Probability of Not Voting derived from the Length of Time Required to Vote
(Interval is from “no wait at all” to “one hour”*

2012

2016

White

0.2 %

0.5 %

Black
Hispanic

0.2 %
0.7 %

1.2 %
1.1 %

All citizens

0.9 %

1.0 %

*The probabilities were retrieved from the following logistic function for the U.S.
All retrieved conditional probabilities are significant at p < .01
Voted (0/1) = α + age + education + family income + married + own home + investor + interest in
public affairs + political engagement + racial resentment scale + partisanship + vote time + е
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Figure 6
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Endnotes
1

The term, ‘time taxes,’ is used by Elora Mukherjee (2009).

2

The CCES survey is made available by Harvard University and MIT. The survey is administered by
YouGov/Polimetrix. Half of the questionnaire consists of Common Content asked of all 50,000+ people, and half of
the questionnaire consists of Team Content designed by each individual participating team and asked of a subset of
1,000 people. The questions used in this analysis are from the Common Content module. For more information see:
https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/
3

The strategy of converting each category to its midpoint in minutes is adapted from Stephen Pettigrew (2017).

The original covered states are Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Virginia, 40 counties in North
Carolina, and 5 counties in Florida. After 1972 Texas and Arizona and selected counties in New York,
California, Michigan and South Dakota are added by the automatic triggering mechanism in the Voting Rights
Act.
4
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